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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“In Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia, there was very efficient 
law enforcement, there was very little privacy, and the winds of freedom did 
not blow.”
1
 Former Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized that there must be 
balance between the citizens’ right to privacy and the need for safety through 
government surveillance.
2
 In order to find that balance, a compromise 
between these interests must be reached.
3
 As Supreme Court Justice Alito 
recently remarked in United States v. Jones, “New technology may provide 
increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many 
people may find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the public does not 
welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology entails, they may 
eventually reconcile themselves to this development as inevitable.”
4
 To 
balance the competing interests of privacy and security, it is the courts’ 
responsibility to apply the Fourth Amendment and ensure that privacy 
tradeoffs do not reach beyond the bounds of constitutionality.
5
 
                                                 
1 William H. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair 
and Effective Law Enforcement? Or: Privacy, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby, 23 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 1, 21 (1974). 
2 See id. at 2. 
3 See id. at 2–3. 
4 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
5 Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional 
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805 (2004) [hereinafter 
Constitutional Myths] (“[T]he courts must update and redefine the Fourth Amendment as 
technology evolves, creating and recreating reasonable rules that effectively regulate law 
2
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After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demand for 
advanced surveillance technologies heightened and government agencies 
redirected efforts toward preventative surveillance rather than post-crime 
investigation.
6
 As a result of the increased demand, these technologies 
became increasingly inexpensive and are therefore accessible by local law 
enforcement agencies.
7
 One new surveillance technology currently in use by 
numerous state and local police departments is Automatic License Plate 
Recognition (ALPR) software.
8
 This technology, which only recently caught 
the attention of privacy advocates and the press, enables law enforcement to 
collect information on the whereabouts of every person who owns and drives 
a vehicle on public roads.
9
 The systems use digital cameras to capture images 
of license plates, which are then recorded along with the time, date, and 
global positioning system (GPS) coordinates where the plate was spotted.
10
 
Widespread use of the devices and compilation of the historical data permit 
officials to track an individual’s movements across town and across the 
country.
11
 This close monitoring of daily movements is used widely and 
without warrants.
12
 
The Fourth Amendment, which protects citizens’ “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” by preventing unreasonable searches and seizures, is 
implicated by such indiscriminate data collection.
13
 Although it is well-
accepted in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a person’s travels on public roads, multiple points 
of location compiled over time may reveal intimate personal details.
14
 The 
                                                                                                                   
enforcement and protect privacy in new technologies. The historical premise suggests that the 
courts should play an active role in the regulation of new technologies because they have done 
so successfully in the past”). 
6 Courtney E. Walsh, Surveillance Technology and the Loss of Something a lot 
Like Privacy: An Examination of the “Mosaic Theory” and the Limits of the Fourth 
Amendment, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 169, 171 (2012); Carla Scherr, You Better Watch Out, 
You Better Not Frown, New Video Surveillance Technologies are Already in Town (and Other 
Public Spaces), 3 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 499, 500 (2008). 
7 Id. Walsh, supra note 6 at 171; Scherr, supra note 6, at 500.  
8 See sources cited infra note 31 (surveying the widespread use of ALPR 
systems throughout United States law enforcement agencies). 
9 See infra text accompanying notes 22–64 (explaining operation of ALPR 
systems and ALPR data compilation practices). 
10 See infra text accompanying note 22 (explaining the use of digital cameras in 
ALPR systems); infra text accompanying note 41 (explaining the information that is collected 
and stored with each ALPR scan). 
11 See infra text accompanying notes 22–64 (explaining operation of ALPR 
systems and ALPR data compilation practices). 
12 See infra text accompanying notes 22–64 (explaining operation of ALPR 
systems and ALPR data compilation practices). 
13 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see 
infra text accompanying notes 189–241. 
14 See infra text accompanying note 108 (recognizing the United States v. Knotts 
holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a person’s public travels); infra 
text accompanying notes 38–64 (detailing the data collection practices of ALPR systems). 
Additionally, courts have held that a privacy interest does not exist in license plates. See 
3
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“mosaic theory,” as set forth in United States v. Maynard and approved by 
the United States v. Jones concurrences, applies the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations to compiled location data.
15
 When ALPR data on a person’s 
license plate is compiled and examined in a mosaic, it violates the driver’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy and infringes Fourth Amendment 
protections.
16
 
Part II of this article begins with a discussion of the widespread use 
of ALPR systems and the advanced technological capabilities of the 
devices.
17
 Next is an examination of the United States Supreme Court’s 
development of Fourth Amendment privacy law concepts and the various 
tests developed to determine the existence of an infringement.
18
 Part II 
concludes with a look at the mosaic theory applied to privacy law, as set 
forth by the United States v. Maynard majority and concurring opinions in 
United States v. Jones.
19
 Part III then argues that widespread collection and 
compilation of ALPR data violates the Fourth Amendment right to privacy 
under the mosaic basis of analysis.
20
 Finally, Part III suggests that, as an 
alternative to adoption of the mosaic theory, ALPR data collection practices 
should be regulated by legislatures.
21
 
                                                                                                                   
United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972, 974 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. 
Matthews, 615 F.2d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 1980)). 
15 See infra text accompanying notes 131–164 (discussing the application of the 
mosaic theory to long-term GPS tracking in United States v. Maynard and the United States v. 
Jones concurrences); United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub 
nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012). 
16 See infra text accompanying notes 189–241 (arguing that the collection of 
multiple ALPR data points over time violates the Fourth Amendment under the mosaic theory 
approach). 
17 See infra text accompanying notes 22–64 (describing the operation of ALPR 
systems and their current usage throughout the world). 
18 See infra text accompanying notes 65–128 (describing Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence before and after Katz). 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 129–188 (discussing the history of the 
mosaic theory and its application in Maynard and Jones). 
20 See infra text accompanying notes 189–252 (arguing that the collection of 
multiple ALPR data points over time violates the Fourth Amendment under the mosaic theory 
approach and that policy dictates such a finding). 
21 See infra text accompanying notes 253–267 (arguing the need for regulation of 
ALPR data collection practices). 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  ALPR: Digital Cameras Capture Location Data of the Entire Driving 
Population 
ALPR systems use specialized digital cameras to automatically 
capture images of nearby license plates on moving or parked vehicles.
22
 
When a license plate passes through the camera’s field of view, the camera 
captures several digital pictures, reading the license plate numbers from the 
images.
23
 The system automatically compares the resulting plate numbers to 
“hotlists”: lists of license plate numbers related to stolen vehicle reports, 
active arrest warrants, AMBER alerts, parolees, and known sex offenders.
24
 
If the system registers a match between a hotlist license plate and an image 
captured, an alert is sent to officers.
25
 The ALPR camera systems may be 
either mobile or stationary. Mobile systems are mounted to the outside of 
police cruisers and capture images of license plates they pass on the road.
26
 
Stationary ALPR systems have additional capabilities.
27
 They can be used to 
set up zones or “geo-fences” where sex offenders, parolees, probationers, or 
others are not permitted to enter or leave.
28
 When the stationary cameras 
register the license plate of a prohibited individual crossing such a restricted 
boundary, officers are alerted.
29
 
The technology was developed in Britain in 1976 and was first used 
in the 1990s as a defense against Irish Republican Army attacks.
30
 Today, 
ALPR systems are used by numerous law enforcement agencies across the 
                                                 
22 INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT FOR 
THE UTILIZATION OF LICENSE PLATE READERS 1, 5 (2009) [hereinafter IACP REPORT], 
available at http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/LPR_Privacy_Impact_Assessment.pdf. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 25–26. 
25 Tyson E. Hubbard, Comment, Automatic License Plate Recognition: An 
Exciting New Law Enforcement Tool with Potentially Scary Consequences, 18 SYRACUSE SCI. 
& TECH L. REP. 3 (2008). 
26 Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 U. 
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 281, 285 (2011). 
27 IACP REPORT, supra note 22, at 24. 
28 Id.; Cyrus Farivar, Your Car, Tracked: The Rapid Rise of License Plate 
Readers, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 27, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/09/your-
car-tracked-the-rapid-rise-of-license-plate-readers/2/. 
29 Farivar, supra note 28; IACP REPORT, supra note 22, at 24. 
30 DAVID J. ROBERTS & MEGHANN CASANOVA, AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE 
RECOGNITION SYSTEMS: POLICY AND OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 1, 5 
(2012) (Nat’l Criminal Justice Reference Serv. Document No. 239604), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/239604.pdf. ALPR, also called Automatic Number 
Plate Recognition (ANPR), was invented in 1976 by the Police Scientific Development 
Branch in the United Kingdom. Id. Irish Republican Army terrorist bombings in the City of 
London prompted creation of the “Ring of Steel” in 1993—a surveillance trap, which initially 
used closed-circuit television cameras. Id. ANPR cameras were incorporated into the “Ring of 
Steel” in 1997. Id. 
5
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United States, as well as in various countries.
31
 In Minnesota, the systems are 
currently used by the cities of Minneapolis, St. Paul, Bloomington, Lakeville, 
Maplewood, Washington County, and by the State Patrol.
32
 Some stationary 
systems are even being used in the private sector.
33
 
Police use of the systems has been widely successful.
34
 The most 
advanced systems are capable of reading 3,600 license plates per minute, and 
are capable of reading plates correctly at a “differential speed” of up to 160 
miles per hour.
35
 Before implementation of ALPR technology, police officers 
could only check license plates against hotlists by manually typing the 
numbers into a computer database.
36
 While a typical police officer can 
manually check 50 to 100 license plates during a shift, an ALPR system has 
                                                 
31 See generally ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 30, at 6–7 (discussing a 2007 
Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey revealing that of those 
surveyed, 48% of large (1,001 or more officers) law enforcement agencies regularly used 
ALPR, 32% of mid-sized (500–1,000 officers) agencies were using ALPR, and 9% of 
agencies with 51–100 officers were using ALPR. None of the smallest (fewer than 50 officers) 
agencies that responded reported using the ALPR. A 2011 survey conducted by the Police 
Executive Research Forum showed that 71% of responding agencies used ALPR, and 85% 
planned to acquire or increase their use of ALPR within five years); Press Release, SEAG 
Professional Parking Solutions, V&A Waterfront Leverages SEAG’s Improved Efficiencies in 
Access Control at Africa’s Most Visited Tourist Destination (Jan. 4, 2012), 
http://www.zeag.com/objekt/4/5494ac1c036755db497af021c52cd16b.pdf (discussing ALPR 
use in South Africa); Farivar, supra note 28(discussing ALPR sales in Canada and Mexico); 
BARRY WATSON & KAREN WALSH, THE ROAD SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF AUTOMATIC NUMBER 
PLATE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY (ANPR) 1, 3–4 (2008) (discussing ALPR use in Australia 
and New Zealand), available at http://eprints.qut.edu.au/13222/. 
32 Eric Roper, Police Cameras Quietly Capture License Plates, Collect Data, 
STAR TRIBUNE (Aug. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Police Cameras], www.startribune.com/local
/minneapolis/165680946.html?page=1&c=y. 
33 Farivar, supra note 28 (Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah, uses ALPR 
systems to scan license plates as cars drive onto campus. Santa Monica, California uses the 
technology to scan plates in parking garages so shoppers can locate lost cars at local shopping 
malls. The Arden Fair Mall in Sacramento, California uses ALPR systems to scan for stolen 
cars). 
34 See POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES: 
“HOW ARE INNOVATIONS IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFORMING POLICING?” 1, 29–32 (2012) 
(discussing the benefits of ALPR shown in a study and experienced by various enforcement 
agencies), available at http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/how%
20are%20innovations%20in%20technology%20transforming%20policing%202012.pdf;); 
ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 30, at 23. 
35 See PIPS TECHNOLOGY, THE DRIVING FORCE IN AUTOMATIC LICENSE PLATE 
RECOGNITION (2009) (manufacturer’s ALPR brochure), available at http://www.
unifiedps.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/pips/lit/PIPS_Law_Enforcement_Solutions.pdf 
36 See MOTOROLA, SOLUTION BRIEF: AUTOMATIC LICENSE PLATE RECOGNITION 
(2011) (manufacturer’s ALPR brochure), available at http://www.motorolasolutions.
com/web/Business/Products/Software%20and%20Applications/Public%20Sector%20Applicat
ions/Video%20Applications/Automatic%20License%20Plate%20Recognition%20%28ALPR
%29/_Documents/Static%20Files/Motorola_ALPR_Solution_Brief.pdf. 
6
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the capability of processing at least 5000 license plates in the same amount 
of time.
37
 
B.  ALPR Data Collection Practices: Location Data is Compiled into 
Extensive Data Banks 
When used as described above, the ALPR technology enhances 
police capabilities.
38
 It records and checks more license plates against hotlists 
than a police officer could manually, and permits lawful traffic stops of 
suspected offenders based on probable cause.
39
 However, one feature of the 
ALPR system is that it compiles and stores the license plate locations it 
encounters, at least until the data is erased.
40
 Each license plate number, 
along with the date, time, and exact global positioning system (GPS) 
coordinates where the plate was scanned are recorded in the ALPR’s 
computer database.
41
 As one city police chief explained, the “real value” of 
the ALPR “comes from the long-term investigative uses of being able to 
track vehicles—where they’ve been and what they’ve been doing.”
42
 There is 
currently no legal standard or guideline regulating how long this data can be 
stored; instead, each law enforcement agency uses its discretion.
43
 Some 
agencies do not keep the data on file for long.
44
 The Minnesota State Patrol, 
for example, retains ALPR data for only 48 hours, while the Saint Paul 
Police Department erases its data after 14 days.
45
 Others, the Washington 
State Police and California Highway Patrol for example, keep the data on file 
                                                 
37 Id. In Minneapolis, Minnesota, the police department’s ten ALPR readers 
captured 805,000 plate numbers in June 2012. Police Cameras, supra note 32. Of those, 
roughly 6,100 matched hotlist plate numbers. Id. When ALPR systems were implemented in 
Long Beach, California, within six months, 929 lost or stolen vehicles were identified, 275 
stolen vehicles were recovered, and 50 arrests were made. MOTOROLA, supra note 37. Within 
thirty days, the same department impounded 300 vehicles and collected over $200,000 in 
delinquent fines and impound fees with the use of ALPR technology. Id. 
38 See supra text accompanying notes 34–37 (discussing the positive effects on 
crime and arrest rates seen with ALPR use). 
39 See supra text accompanying notes 34–37. Prior cases have determined that 
manual checks of license plate numbers are constitutional and when such a check registers a 
hit with a hotlist, there is probable cause for a lawful stop. See United States v. Walraven, 892 
F.2d 972 (10th Cir. 1989). 
40 E.g., ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 30 at 28. 
41 Id.  
42 Brian Alseth, Automated License Plate Recognition: The Newest Threat to 
Your Privacy When You Travel, ACLU BLOG (May 26, 2010, 9:31 AM) (quoting Charlie 
Beck, Los Angeles Police Dep’t Chief of Detectives), http://www.aclu-
wa.org/blog/automated-license-plate-recognition-newest-threat-your-privacy-when-you-
travel. 
43 IACP REPORT, supra note 22, at 37 (recognizing the need for standards and 
policies for ALPR data retention). 
44 See Police Cameras, supra note 32 (noting that Maine requires police to erase 
such data in 21 days unless it is being used for an investigation). 
45 Police Cameras, supra note 32. 
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for up to sixty days.
46
 The Minneapolis Police Department, Tennessee 
Highway Patrol, and Maryland State Police Department retain their ALPR 
data for a full year.
47
 The New York State Police Department is currently one 
of few law enforcement agencies without a limit on its ALPR data retention; 
they keep the data indefinitely.
48
 Retaining the logs of license plate numbers, 
times, and locations permits police to use the technology retroactively.
49
 
Police can sort through data that is months or years old to locate vehicles on 
a certain date at a certain location, or, arguably more concerning, to track the 
long-term movements of a particular individual.
50
 
Additionally, the data from multiple jurisdictions and states is being 
combined by federal agencies and third-party companies into massive 
national databases.
51
 One company based in California operates what it calls 
the National Vehicle Location Service: a private database, currently with 
over 550 million license plate entries collected by the company and 
submitted by public entities.
52
 The database is available for use by law 
enforcement investigators at no cost.
53
 Such an expansive bank of ALPR data 
permits agencies to broadly track an individual’s movements across the 
country.
54
 
While there may be legitimate reasons for tracking an individual’s 
movements over time, ALPR cameras and computers do not distinguish 
                                                 
46 Farivar, supra note 28. 
47 Id. Police Cameras, supra note 32. 
48 Farivar, supra note 28. 
49 ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 30, at 28. 
50 See id.; MOTOROLA, supra note 36. 
51 See infra text accompanying notes 52–54 (discussing the compilation of ALPR 
data by federal agencies and third parties). 
52 Farivar, supra note 28. The company boasts that it has around 22,000 U.S. law 
enforcement officers utilizing the system, and around 1,000 more access the system each 
month. Id. 
53 Id. While the only identifying information recorded by the ALPR systems is 
license plate numbers, the plate numbers can be cross-referenced with Department of Motor 
Vehicles information to determine vehicle owners, and therefore the likely drivers of the 
vehicles tracked. Since every car must be registered, access to license plate numbers and 
Department of Motor Vehicle records permits tracking of every individual with a registered 
vehicle. See Cynthia Lum et al., CENTER FOR EVIDENCE-BASED CRIME POLICY, GEORGE 
MASON UNIVERSITY, LICENSE PLATE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY (LPR): IMPACT EVALUATION 
AND COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT 1, 67 (2010), available at http://cebcp.org/wp-content
/evidence-based-policing/LPR_FINAL.pdf. 
54 This has piqued the interest of some federal agencies. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement recently awarded a contract to the company operating the National 
Vehicle Location Service to compile a database that would assist with locating fugitive 
immigrants. Farivar, supra note 28. The Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and 
Border Protection and the Drug Enforcement Agency are also reportedly sharing license plate 
information banks. Andy Greenberg, U.S. Customs Tracks Millions of License Plates and has 
Shared Data with Insurance Firms, FORBES (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/08/21/documents-show-u-s-customs-tracking-millions-of-
license-plates-and-sharing-data-with-insurance-firms. 
8
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criminals from non-criminals.
55
 The systems indiscriminately photograph 
and record the license plates they encounter.
56
 This permits law enforcement 
entities and third parties to track the whereabouts of every person with a 
registered vehicle in the United States, a fact that has the American Civil 
Liberties Union and others on edge due to the potential for privacy 
invasions.
57
 
Not only are potential privacy invasions by government entities a 
concern with ALPR technology, but issues also arise from the federal 
Freedom of Information Act and similar state laws.
58
 With few exceptions, 
these laws grant citizens the right to access information from government 
agencies.
59
 In at least some states, ALPR data is not within any of the 
statutory exceptions to what may be requested under the statutes, and 
therefore ALPR records may be requested from government agencies by any 
citizen.
60
 Broad access to ALPR data by the public has the potential for 
dangerous consequences.
61
 
With ALPR data files open to such wide uses and audiences, there is 
much potential for abuse stemming from data collection policies.
62
 The 
longer an entity retains ALPR data, and therefore the more location data 
points that are compiled together into a single database, the more extensively 
a person’s whereabouts may be tracked.
63
 Currently, at least two states have 
enacted legislation that limits state agencies’ ALPR data collection practices, 
but restrictions on data retention practices are the exception.
64
 
                                                 
55 ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 30, at 30. 
56 Id. 
57 Cade Crockford, In Massachusets, a Registry of Everywhere You’ve Ever 
Driven?, ACLU (May 15, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/
massachusetts-registry-everywhere-youve-ever-driven (characterizing ALPR systems as a 
“warrantless tracking tool, enabling retroactive surveillance of millions of people”); IACP 
REPORT, supra note 22, at 2. 
58 See Police Cameras, supra note 32. 
59 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FOIA.GOV, http://www.foia.gov 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
60 See Police Cameras, supra note 32 (a local Minnesota reporter requested 
ALPR data on his own license plate from the Minneapolis Police Department under the 
Minnesota Open Records Law and received “a list of dates, times, and coordinates of his car 
that illustrated his daily routine”). After reading that reporter’s news story, a Minneapolis 
business owner used the Minnesota Open Records Law to track and ultimately repossess at 
least one car he had sold to a customer and on which he had not received payment. Eric 
Roper, Man Uses License Plate Data to Repossess Car in Minneapolis, STAR TRIBUNE (Aug. 
30, 2012), http://www.startribune.com/local/blogs/168014676.html. 
61 See Police Cameras, supra note 32 (noting that Bob Sykora, chief information 
officer for the Minnesota Board of Public Defense, warned in a June 2012 memo that ALPR 
location data is public due to open records laws, and therefore could enable “burglars to learn 
someone’s daily routine or ex-spouses to track former partners”). 
62 IACP REPORT, supra note 22, at 17. 
63 See supra text accompanying notes 40–50 (describing the data that is collected 
and retained by ALPR systems, and how that data is used by police). 
64 Rushin, supra note 26, at 286. Maine limits retention of ALPR data to twenty-
one days, declares the data as confidential, and does not permit ALPR systems to be used by 
9
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C.  The “Privacies of Life” are Introduced into Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence 
Federal and state law agencies’ warrantless use of ALPR technology 
calls constitutional privacy into question.
65
 The Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution protects privacy interests by preventing 
unreasonable searches and seizures.
66
 While there is no mention of “privacy” 
within the Amendment text or its legislative history, the concept of privacy is 
an accepted extension of the Amendment in modern courts.
67
 The text 
provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated.”
68
 Recognition of the Amendment’s privacy protections was first 
put forward in Boyd v. United States, the Supreme Court’s first significant 
examination of the Fourth Amendment.
69
 The Court acknowledged the 
Amendment’s original purpose, which was directed toward British officials’ 
abuse of warrants in colonial times.
70
 Thus relying on the inherent rights of 
private property, the Boyd Court found that the Amendment protects “the 
sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life,” and Fourth Amendment 
privacy was born.
71
 
The text of the Amendment only applies to limit government 
practices if the practices qualify as a “search” or a “seizure” as those terms 
have been interpreted.
72
 A seizure of property occurs when “there is some 
meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interest in that 
                                                                                                                   
citizens. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 29-A, § 2117-A (2009). The New Hampshire statute is more 
general and actually prohibits the use of surveillance on public highways through the use of 
GPS. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 236:130 (2011); see generally Patricia Bellia, The Memory Gap 
in Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 151–52 (stating that data storage has become 
increasingly cheap and regulations are the exception rather than the rule). 
65 See supra text accompanying notes 38–64 (discussing ALPR data collection 
practices). 
66 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
67 Walsh, supra note 6, at 175. 
68 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
69 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Fourth Amendment cases were 
rare during the nineteenth century, partially because the Supreme Court did not have 
jurisdiction to hear appeals by criminal defendants until 1891. Note, Formalism, Legal 
Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 945, 952 n.42 (1977). The only case prior to Boyd that significantly discussed 
the Fourth Amendment was Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877). In that case, the Court said 
in dictum that letters in the mail could only be opened pursuant to a warrant. Id. at 733. The 
Court suggested that the warrant could not be used for the purpose of examining private 
letters. Id. at 735–36. 
70 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 624–26; see Walsh, supra, note 6, at 176; see also 
Constitutional Myths, supra note 5, at 816 (“The Fourth Amendment was enacted largely in 
response to English cases such as Entick v. Carrington, in which Lord Camden had declared 
that ‘our law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his 
neighbor’s close without his leave”’) (quoting 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765)). 
71 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. 
72 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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property,” and a seizure of a person occurs “when governmental termination 
of a person’s movement is effected through means intentionally applied.”
73
 
Since property is not physically seized when an ALPR system captures an 
individual’s license plate number and compares it to a hotlist, nor is the 
driver’s movement terminated, it is a search and not a seizure that is at 
issue.
74
 
D.  What is a Search? Katz and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy 
As Justice Scalia recently pointed out in the majority opinion of 
United States v. Jones, the Fourth Amendment has a close connection to 
property and “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law 
trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century.”
75
 In determining 
whether a search occurred, early cases focused on whether there was a 
physical trespass.
76
 In one of the earliest cases involving technological 
surveillance by law enforcement, the Supreme Court ruled in Olmstead v. 
United States that a wiretap on a telephone wire in a public street did not 
constitute a Fourth Amendment search because there was no physical 
trespass “upon any property of the defendants.”
77
 However, as surveillance 
methods grew progressively more intrusive, the Supreme Court finally 
diverged from the Fourth Amendment’s ties to property law in Katz v. United 
States.
78
 
In Katz, the Supreme Court declared that the amendment “protects 
people, not places,” and that each person is entitled to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.
79
 The case involved the FBI’s use of a listening 
device placed outside a public phone booth to record the defendant’s side of 
conversations.
80
 Under traditional privacy law, there was no privacy 
violation due to the absence of a physical trespass.
81
 However, the Court 
recognized the need to reevaluate privacy law in view of emerging 
technologies and held that the defendant’s conversation was constitutionally 
protected, not because of a “general constitutional ‘right to privacy,’” but 
because the Amendment protects what a person “seeks to preserve as 
                                                 
73 Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 113 S.Ct. 538, 543 (1992) (quoting United States 
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)) (definition of a search); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 
U.S. 593, 593 (1989) (definition of a seizure). 
74 See supra text accompanying notes 22–29 (detailing the operation of ALPR 
systems). 
75 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 949 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001)); 
Constitutional Myths, supra note 5, at 816. 
76 See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303–06 (1967). 
77 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928), overruled by Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
78 Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
79 Id. at 351–52. 
80 Id. at 348. 
81 Id. at 350. 
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private.”
82
 The Court reasoned that since Katz closed the telephone booth 
door behind him and placed money into the phone, he was “entitled to 
assume that the words he utter[ed] into the mouthpiece” were not “broadcast 
to the world.”
83
 The Court recognized that what a person “seeks to preserve 
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”
84
 
After Katz, the Supreme Court continued to recognize that a physical 
intrusion is not a necessary element of a Fourth Amendment search and 
adopted the two-pronged test articulated in Justice Harlan’s Katz 
concurrence.
85
 The concurrence was an attempt to elaborate and bring clarity 
to the Katz analysis, but produced what has been criticized as an unworkable 
and circular test.
86
 Under this test, the Court will find that a Fourth 
Amendment search occurred if the police action (1) invaded an individual’s 
“actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and (2) if that expectation is one 
that “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”
87
 The test, therefore, 
places emphasis on both a subjective and objective examination of the 
defendant’s expectation of privacy. 
E.  The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment Considerations of 
Technological Surveillance Methods after Katz 
1.  Subjective Intent to Keep Private 
The subjective prong of the test hinges on an outward manifestation 
of privacy concerns: a person must have “exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy.”
88
 “[O]bjects, activities, or statements that [a person] 
exposes to ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention 
to keep them to himself has been exhibited.”
89
 Courts’ difficulty with the 
subjective element is in determining what constitutes such a showing of 
                                                 
82 Id. at 350–51. 
83 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. 
84 Id. at 351. 
85 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 
(1979); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 
(1986). 
86 Jim Harper, Reforming Fourth Amendment Privacy Doctrine, 57 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1381, 1386–95 (2008) (“[Harlan’s test] converted a factual question—had the defendant 
barred others from access to the information?—into a murky two-part analysis with a quasi-
subjective part and a quasi-objective part. It is an analysis that courts have mangled ever since. 
And for good reason: It is almost impossible to administer”); see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 
(applying the Katz standard but recognizing that it has often been criticized as circular, 
subjective, and unpredictable); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“those actual (subjective) expectations of privacy that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that 
this Court considers reasonable” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
87 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. (quotations in original). 
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privacy.
90
 Katz’s act of “shut[ting] the door behind him, and pay[ing] the 
toll” were unequivocal acts of an intent to conceal.
91
 Such clear outward 
manifestations do not necessarily reflect in every expectation of daily 
privacy.
92
 Outward manifestations of a desire for privacy are particularly 
difficult to identify in the information age, as individuals may hold 
expectations of privacy in information that does not necessarily exist in a 
physical form.
93
 
2.  Objective Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and the Supreme Court’s 
Distinction between Enhancing and Extrasensory Technologies 
Regarding the objective element, the Supreme Court has focused its 
analysis on the intrusiveness of the technologies used by law enforcement to 
collect the information, drawing distinctions between those methods that 
merely enhance an officer’s natural abilities and technologies that create 
extrasensory abilities.
94
 For example, in United States v. Caceres, the 
Supreme Court held that the Internal Revenue Service’s use of a hidden 
recording device to record conversations with the defendant was not a Fourth 
Amendment search.
95
 The Court reasoned that the recording device did not 
violate a reasonable expectation of privacy, because it only produced the 
equivalent of an agent taking notes during or after the conversations and 
therefore only enhanced the officer’s natural abilities.
96
 Whether the account 
of the conversations was based on the agent’s memory or on a recorded tape, 
the result was the same and was not a constitutional violation.
97
 
Other surveillance technologies yielded similar results.
98
 In Smith v. 
Maryland, the Supreme Court held that use of a pen register to record 
telephone numbers dialed into a phone is like obtaining the phone numbers 
                                                 
90 Harper, supra note 86 at 1386–87. 
91 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. 
92 See Harper, supra note 86, at 1386–87. 
93 See Haley Plourde-Cole, Note, Back to Katz: Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy in the Facebook Age, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 571, 618 (2010). 
94 See Adam Koppel, Note, Warranting a Warrant: Fourth Amendment Concerns 
Raised by Law Enforcement’s Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking, 64 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1061, 1070–71 (2010) (survey of post-Katz technological surveillance 
Supreme Court cases); Rushin, supra, note 30, at 34 (explaining that the use of “sense-
enhancing technology” to conduct a search into a constitutionally protected area is 
unconstitutional). 
95 United Sates v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 751 (1979). 
96 Id. at 750–51; see also On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) 
(undercover government agent’s use of hidden microphone to record conversations without 
defendant’s knowledge was no more intrusive than “eavesdropping outside an open window” 
and therefore not a search. The Court also notes that “[t]he use of bifocals, field glasses or the 
telescope to magnify the object of a witness’ vision is not a forbidden search or seizure”). 
97 Caceres, 440 U.S. at 750–51. 
98 See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S at 735; Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 
227 (1986). 
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from an operator.
99
 The technology only made an officer’s job more efficient 
and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
100
 Similarly, in Dow 
Chemical Co. v. United States, the Court considered the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s use of aerial photography to view Dow Chemical’s 
manufacturing plant after the company denied a request for an on-site 
inspection.
101
 The Court held that the surveillance method was constitutional 
because it merely enhanced human vision.
102
 
3.  Knotts and Karo: Public Surveillance Cannot Cross the Threshold to 
the Home 
In addition to the extra-sensory distinction, the Supreme Court 
revealed through United States v. Knotts and United States v. Karo that there 
is a reasonable expectation of privacy inside the home, safe from public 
surveillance.
103
 Knotts and Karo both involved police use of “beepers,” 
which are radio transmitters that emit weak signals.
104
 The signal can be 
picked up by a radio receiver held within range, allowing police to follow the 
signal while remaining out of site.
105
 In Knotts, officers attached a beeper to 
a container of chloroform and monitored its movement from the 
manufacturer—where the defendant purchased it—to the defendant’s 
home.
106
 The Supreme Court held that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment 
rights were not violated because the use of the beeper technology simply 
augmented the officers’ visual abilities.
107
 The technology in Knotts only 
enhanced the police’s ability to follow the suspect in plain view on public 
thoroughfares, where there is “no reasonable expectation of privacy.”
108
 
Although Knotts articulated the proposition that public surveillance is 
acceptable under the Fourth Amendment, the Court reserved the question of 
continuous, long-term surveillance, stating: “if such dragnet-type law 
enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there 
will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional 
principles may be applicable.”
109
 
                                                 
99 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744. (“Petitioner concedes that if he had placed his calls 
through an operator, he could claim no legitimate expectation of privacy”). 
100 See id. 
101 Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 227. 
102 Id. at 228. 
103 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 
705 (1984); see Constitutional Myths, supra note 5, at 831–37. 
104 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277; Karo, 468 U.S. at 707. 
105 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277. 
106 Id. at 278. 
107 Id. at 282. 
108 Id. at 281–82. 
109 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283–84. Other courts recognized this limitation of the 
Knotts ruling. See, e.g., United States v. Butts, 729 F.2d 1514, 1518 n.4 (5th Cir. 1984) (“As 
did the Supreme Court in Knotts, we pretermit any ruling on worst-case situations that may 
involve persistent, extended, or unlimited violations of a warrant’s terms”); Maynard, 615 
14
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In the following year, the Karo Court distinguished Knotts because 
the beeper used in Karo revealed information about what was inside the 
home.
110
 In Karo, officers used a beeper attached to a container of ether to 
determine whether the container was still inside a home after it had been 
tracked there.
111
 As the Karo court pointed out, the police in Knotts ceased 
collecting information from the beeper after it reached its destination.
112
 In 
Karo, however, monitoring of the location continued, revealing “a critical 
fact about the interior of the premises that the Government . . . could not 
have otherwise obtained without a warrant.”
113
 In this way, the technology 
was being used to give the officers the extrasensory ability to know whether 
the ether remained in the house or had been moved.
114
 Both subjective and 
objective elements of the Katz analysis seemed to rely on the fact that 
information was collected from within the home, and the court drew a clear 
distinction on that fact.
115
 Together, Knotts and Karo stand for the 
proposition that the threshold of the home is a barrier to warrantless 
surveillance.
116
 
4.  Jones and Global Positioning System Tracking: The Court Avoids the 
Issue by Going Back to the Fourth Amendment’s Property Law Roots 
The most recent Supreme Court decision considering Fourth 
Amendment privacy in light of technological surveillance was United States 
v. Jones.
117
 In Jones, officers placed a GPS device on Jones’s vehicle to 
continuously track his location for twenty-eight days.
118
 In the D.C. Circuit 
Court below, the court found the surveillance of Jones to be a Fourth 
Amendment violation under the Katz analysis.
119
 After reserving the question 
of long-term surveillance in Knotts, and with the D.C. Circuit already having 
conducted the analysis, the Supreme Court was well placed to consider long-
                                                                                                                   
F.3d at 556–57 (Noting that he [Knotts] Court avoided the question whether prolonged 
“twenty-four hour surveillance” was a search by limiting its holding to the facts of the case 
before it.) (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283). 
110 Karo, 468 U.S. at 707. 
111 Id. at 708–10. 
112 Id. at 715. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 See Karo, 468 at 715. Kyllo furthered the in-home distinction created by Knotts 
and Karo, determining that thermal imaging of the inside of a home was a Fourth Amendment 
violation. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 34–40 (2001). 
116 See Knotts, 460 U.S. 276; Karo, 468 U.S. 705; see Constitutional Myths, supra 
note 5, at 835 (“At first blush, Kyllo and Karo may appear to embrace expansive Fourth 
Amendment protections in new technologies. I think it is more accurate to understand these 
cases as conservative decisions. They are conservative in that they are trying to retain the very 
core of traditional Fourth Amendment protections: the protection of information about the 
home traditionally enforced by property law”). 
117 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 945. 
118 Id. at 948. 
119 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563. 
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term surveillance under the Katz analysis.
120
 However, the majority opinion 
avoided the issue once again.
121
 Rather than follow the Katz reasonableness 
test, and thereby be forced to consider the objective and subjective 
reasonableness of long-term location data, the Court reverted to the Fourth 
Amendment’s property law roots, finding that the officers’ action of placing 
a GPS device on the defendant’s vehicle was a common law trespass and 
therefore a search.
122
 The Court thus affirmed the Maynard D.C. Circuit 
opinion, but on the unexpected grounds of a physical trespass. The opinion 
was reminiscent of the 1928 case, Olmstead, which Katz overruled.
123
 The 
Court successfully distinguished Katz, Knotts, and the majority of 
technological surveillance cases considering the Fourth Amendment because 
those cases did not involve a physical trespass.
124
 
Despite this resurrection of “18th century tort law,” the Court stated 
that a case of purely technological surveillance would “remain subject to the 
Katz analysis.”
125
 The Court stated only that such constant technological 
surveillance of Jones over a four-week period without a physical trespass 
“may be . . . an unconstitutional invasion of privacy,” but declined to answer 
the question.
126
 However, concurring opinions written by Justices Sotomayor 
and Alito did attempt to answer the question, and Justice Alito chastised the 
Court for relying on old property law, rather than examining the modern 
issue of technological surveillance.
127
 The Jones concurrences, as well as the 
lower court, relied on a form of the “mosaic theory” to suggest that the 
government’s compilation of information over a four-week period invaded 
the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
128
 
F.  The Mosaic Theory of Aggregated Data Creates a Privacy Interest in 
the Whole 
The mosaic theory encompasses the idea that individual pieces of 
otherwise unimportant information, when grouped together, can amount to 
important intelligence information that requires high-level confidential 
                                                 
120 See id. at 557 (discussing the Supreme Court’s reservation of the question of 
constant surveillance in Knotts, and that the question was squarely presented in the case of 
Maynard/Jones). 
121 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 950 (“[W]e need not address the Government’s contentions 
[that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle’s locations on public roads], 
because Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation”). 
122 Id. at 949. 
123 Compare Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464, with Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 949; see supra 
text accompanying note 77 (discussing Olmstead). 
124 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 951–52. 
125 Id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring), 953. 
126 Id. at 954 (emphasis added). 
127 See id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring). 
128 See id. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 964 (Alito, 
J., concurring). 
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treatment.
129
 The concept has been used by government agencies for decades 
to justify the need to keep certain information confidential.
130
 Prior to 
Maynard, the mosaic theory does not appear to have been applied to Fourth 
Amendment protections. 
1.  United States v. Maynard and the Jones Concurrences: Applying the 
Mosaic Theory to Long-Term Surveillance Data Under Fourth 
Amendment Privacy Analysis 
United States v. Maynard was the D.C. Circuit Court’s opinion about 
the tracking of Jones that was later affirmed sub nom. and under different 
grounds in Jones.
131
 Before the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, 
Maynard incorporated the mosaic theory into its Fourth Amendment analysis 
of the government’s long-term GPS tracking
132
 of Jones and thereby found a 
privacy violation based on the long-term accumulation of data.
133
 The court 
first determined that Knotts did not control because the issue of long-term 
surveillance was expressly reserved in that case.
134
 Thus, the facts 
surrounding the government’s collection of GPS data from Jones’s car were 
just the type of “dragnet” surveillance that the Supreme Court avoided 
considering in Knotts.
135
 The Maynard court then turned to the Katz two-
prong Fourth Amendment analysis.
136
 
                                                 
129 David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of 
Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 630 (2005). 
130 Id.; In the midst of the Cold War, use of the theory as a justification expanded, 
and was expressly adopted in an Executive Order issued by President Reagan 1982 as a type 
of classified information. Christina E. Wells, CIA v. Sims: Mosaic Theory and Government 
Attitude, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 845, 857 (2006); Exec. Order No. 12356 § 1.3(b), 47 FR 14874 
(1982). For a discussion on the executive order, the Clinton administration’s abandonment of 
the mosaic concept in national security, and further executive treatment of the concept after 
9/11, see Pozen, supra note 129 at 641–58. 
131 Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012). 
Maynard and Jones were co-conspirators tried together, but the GPS tracking device was 
placed on Jones’s car and relevant only to his case. 
132 While ALPR data relies in part on GPS coordinates, as used in this article, 
“GPS data” will refer only to continuous location data such as that obtained by the GPS 
tracking device in Jones. “ALPR data” will refer to the intermittent location data collected 
through the use of multiple ALPR cameras and compiled in a database. 
133 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 564. Although, the Supreme Court upheld the decision 
based not on the mosaic theory, but on trespass law concepts in that the placement of the GPS 
device on Jones’s car was a physical trespass, which violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 
See supra text accompanying notes 117–128 (discussing the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
United States v. Jones). 
134 Id. at 557 (“Knotts held only that a person traveling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another, not that such a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements 
whatsoever, world without end . . .” (internal citations omitted)). 
135 Id. at 558; see Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283–84. 
136 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558. 
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In considering whether there was a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, the court concluded that the whole of Jones’s movements over the 
twenty-eight day period was not actually or constructively exposed to the 
public, and that there was therefore a reasonable expectation of privacy.
137
 
The court drew a distinction between “single journey[s]” and the mosaic of 
several journeys summed up over a length of time.
138
 Analogizing to early 
cases that relied on the mosaic theory to restrict public access to confidential 
government data, the court held that Jones had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy “in his movements over the course of a month” and that a reasonable 
person “expects each of those movements to remain disconnected and 
anonymous.”
139
 The court illustrated the mosaic theory’s application to a 
person’s movements: 
Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a 
story not told by any single visit . . . . [A] single trip to a 
gynecologist’s office tells little about a woman, but that trip 
followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store 
tells a different story. A person who knows all of another’s 
travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a 
heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, 
an outpatient receiving medical treatment, [or] an associate 
of particular individuals or political groups.
140
 
With regard to the subjective element of the Katz analysis, the court 
relied on the fact that a person could not realistically record and track all the 
movements of another.
141
 This is an example of what Professor Orin Kerr 
                                                 
137 Id. at 559–64. 
138 Id. at 562. 
139 Id. at 563 (internal quotations omitted). 
140 Id. at 562. Julian Sanchez also posed an illustrative hypothetical regarding the 
mosaic theory as applied to GPS data in his Cato @ Liberty blog. “Alice and Bob are having a 
romantic affair that, for whatever reason, they prefer to keep secret. One evening before a 
planned date, Bob stops by the corner pharmacy and—in full view of a shop full of 
strangers—buys some condoms. He then drives to a restaurant where, again in full view of the 
other patrons, they have dinner together. They later drive in separate cars back to Alice’s 
house, where the neighbors (if they care to take note) can observe from the presence of the car 
in the driveway that Alice has an evening guest for several hours. It being a weeknight, Bob 
then returns home, again by public roads. Now, the point of this little story is . . . that in 
ordinary life, we often reasonably suppose the privacy or secrecy of certain facts—that Bob 
and Alice are having an affair—that could in principle be inferred from the combination of 
other facts that are (severally) clearly public, because it would be highly unusual for all of 
them to be observed by the same public.” Julian Sanchez, GPS Tracking and a ‘Mosaic 
Theory’ of Government Searches, CATO@LIBERTY (Aug. 11, 2010, 9:22PM), https://www.
cato-at-liberty.org/gps-tracking-and-a-mosaic-theory-of-government-searches/ (emphasis in 
original). 
141 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 560. 
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defined as the “probabilistic model” of the subjective element.
142
 With this 
model, a subjective expectation of privacy exists when there is a low 
likelihood that another person or the police could ascertain the information in 
question.
143
 The court held that the likelihood that another would observe all 
of the movements captured by the GPS device was “essentially nil.”
144
 
With Maynard, the D.C. Circuit Court introduced a novel idea into 
the Fourth Amendment context by finding a privacy interest in the aggregate 
of Jones’s actions that would not otherwise exist in each individual 
movement.
145
 While the court affirmed the principle that “[w]hat a person 
knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection,” it determined that the whole of a person’s movements over 
twenty-eight days is not actually exposed to the public.
146
 Despite the 
innovation of Maynard, on appeal, the Supreme Court majority in Jones 
declined to consider the theory after it found that this case involved a 
physical trespass, which made for a simpler Fourth Amendment analysis.
147
 
However, other concurring justices did examine the mosaic concept in 
Jones.
148
 
Justices Sotomayor and Alito each wrote concurring opinions in the 
Jones case.
149
 While neither opinion expressly endorsed the mosaic theory of 
the Fourth Amendment put forth by the lower court, both opinions clearly 
supported the idea that the sum of GPS data collected on Jones was a Fourth 
                                                 
142 See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 503, 506 (2007). 
143 Id. The probabilistic model of the subjective element was also applied in 
California v. Ciarolo, 467 U.S. 207 (1986). That case involved aerial surveillance revealing 
marijuana plants on the defendant’s property. The Court held that in an age of regular air 
travel, the plants were likely to be viewed by others, and therefore the subjective expectation 
of privacy element was not met. Ciarolo, 467 U.S. at 213–14. 
144 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 560. 
145 Orin Kerr, D.C. Circuit Court Introduces “Mosaic Theory” of Fourth 
Amendment, Holds GPS Monitoring a Fourth Amendment Search, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Aug. 6, 2010, 2:46 PM) [hereinafter D.C. Circuit Introduces], http://www.volokh.com
/2010/08/06/d-c-circuit-introduces-mosaic-theory-of-fourth-amendment-holds-gps-
monitoring-a-fourth-amendment-search/. After Maynard, but before the Jones decision came 
down, the mosaic concept was applied by courts in other technology cases, such as in cases of 
police applications seeking to obtain cell site location data from defendants’ cell phones under 
the Stored Communications Act. Compare In re Application of the United States, 736 
F.Supp.2d 578 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010) (application requesting cell side location data for a 
period of 58 days required warrant because “cumulative cell-site-location records implicate 
sufficiently serious protected privacy concerns”) with In re Application of the United States, 
No. 11 MC 0113, 2011 WL 579925 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011) (application for a period of 21 
days did not require warrant). 
146 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 559–60. 
147 See supra text accompanying notes 117–128 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in United States v. Jones). 
148 See infra text accompanying notes 149–164 (discussing Justices Sotomayor’s 
and Alito’s concurring opinions in United States v. Jones). 
149 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
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Amendment violation.
150
 Justice Alito’s concurrence, with which Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined, began by criticizing the majority’s use 
of property law concepts in its Fourth Amendment analysis, and anticipated 
difficulties with future cases that involve only technological surveillance 
without physical contact.
151
 
Justice Alito’s analysis applied the Katz test and is reminiscent of the 
majority opinion in Maynard.
152
 Alito drew a distinction between “relatively 
short-term monitoring” and the “long-term monitoring” over a twenty-eight 
day period of Jones.
153
 He concluded that society does not expect police or 
others to “monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s 
car for a very long period.”
154
 Both subjective and objective elements of the 
analysis rested on application of the concept of a mosaic of information.
155
 
Alito also applied the probabilistic model for the subjective element that was 
used in the lower court.
156
 Since Jones’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
was violated, there was a Fourth Amendment search under Alito’s 
analysis.
157
 
Finally, Justice Sotomayor set forth a separate concurring opinion in 
Jones that provided for an even more expansive view of Fourth Amendment 
privacy.
158
 Sotomayor agreed with the majority’s use of property law 
concepts, stating that it was a finding based on a “constitutional 
minimum.”
159
 Sotomayor also agreed with Alito’s opinion that long-term 
GPS surveillance invades reasonable privacy expectations.
160
 She went 
further, however, and reasoned that even short-term “GPS monitoring 
generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements 
that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, 
religious, and sexual associations.”
161
 Sotomayor stated that these 
considerations should be taken into account when considering the 
                                                 
150 Orin Kerr, What’s the Status of the Mosaic Theory After Jones?, THE VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 23, 2012, 1:59 PM) [hereinafter What’s the Status], http://volokh.
com/2012/01/23/whats-the-status-of-the-mosaic-theory-after-jones/; Walsh, supra note 6, at 
223. 
151 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 962–67. (Alito, J., concurring). 
152 Compare Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 957–64, with Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561–64. 
153 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id.; see supra text accompanying note 154 (quoting Justice Alito’s application 
of the probabilistic model to the subjective element of the Katz analysis in his Jones 
concurrence); see also What’s the Status, supra note 150. 
157 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
158 See id. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
159 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor agreed with the 
majority’s “constitutional minimum” because a physical trespass occurred when the police 
officers placed the GPS tracking device on Jones’s vehicle. However, in a future case without 
such a physical trespass, Justice Sotomayor’s opinion suggests that she will be willing to find 
a Fourth Amendment violation in the aggregation of technological surveillance alone. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. (citations omitted). 
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government’s look into the “sum of one’s public movements,” suggesting 
that she would place emphasis on the degree of privacy of the information 
obtained, but not necessarily the length of monitoring time as a grounds for 
violating a reasonable expectation of privacy.
162
 
Thus, a total of five Supreme Court justices concurred in a 
willingness to accept a mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy in the 
Jones case.
163
 Despite Justice Scalia’s characterization of the mosaic concept 
as one of “novelty” raising “thorny problems,” Jones may have set the Court 
up for a future 5-4 majority holding for mosaic theory Fourth Amendment 
when a case arises with purely technological surveillance and no physical 
trespass.
164
 
2.  The Future of the Mosaic Theory in Fourth Amendment Privacy: 
United States v. Graham, Criticisms, and Limitations 
In one of the first cases to consider technological location data since 
the Jones decision, the federal district court that decided United States v. 
Graham chose not to apply the mosaic concept advocated by the Jones 
concurrences.
165
 In Graham, the defendant sought to have historical cell site 
location data suppressed after it was obtained from his cell phone by 
police.
166
 The defendant argued that the historical data obtained in the 
aggregate revealed patterns and “paint[ed] an intimate picture of [his] 
whereabouts over an extensive period of time.”
167
 
The Graham court recognized Maynard’s introduction of the mosaic 
theory and that the theory was supported by the concurrences in Jones.
168
 
Despite the court’s observation that “a five justice [Supreme Court] majority 
is willing to accept the principle that government surveillance over time can 
implicate an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy,” the Graham 
                                                 
162 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
163 Justices Sotomayor and Alito wrote the concurring opinions that suggested a 
mosaic-based analysis, and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined in Alito’s opinion. 
See Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945. 
164 See supra text accompanying notes 149–163 (discussing the two concurring 
opinions in Jones); supra note 159 (discussing Justice Sotomayor’s agreement with both the 
majority and Alito’s opinion). 
165 United States v. Graham, 846 F.Supp.2d 384 (D. Md. 2012). 
166 Id. at 386. When a cell phone is turned on, it constantly communicates and 
registers with close cell phone towers. By identifying which tower the cell phone registered 
with at a certain point in time, the user’s location can be pinpointed to within less than 200 
feet. This information is stored by wireless companies and can be obtained by police under the 
Stored Communications Act, which requires a lesser showing than a warrant. Walsh, supra 
note 6, at 239. 
167 Graham, 846 F.Supp.2d at 387. Graham involved two magistrate judge orders 
for historical cell site information. The first order authorized the release of fourteen days of 
data containing 1,628 individual cell site location data points, while the second order 
authorized two hundred twenty-one days and 20,235 individual cell site location data points. 
Id. 
168 Id. at 391–94. 
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court withheld application of the mosaic theory, stating that “the law as it 
now stands simply does not contemplate a situation whereby traditional 
surveillance becomes a Fourth Amendment ‘search’ only after some specific 
period of time.”
169
 
In its apprehension to apply the mosaic theory, the Graham court 
noted what is considered one of the major flaws of the theory: “retroactive 
unconstitutionality.”
170
 The Maynard majority and Jones concurrences 
indicated that a shorter length of GPS monitoring, something shorter than 
twenty-eight days, would have been permissible under the mosaic theory.
171
 
Assuming that the first day of monitoring alone would have been 
permissible, then at the end of the first day, Jones’s rights were not 
violated.
172
 When the data later accumulated into a mosaic and revealed 
detailed information about Jones’s life, that first day of data became part of 
an unconstitutional scheme.
173
 The crux of the concept put forth by the 
opinions is that the mosaic is considered as a whole, with a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in its entirety.
174
 Thus, one piece of data that may be 
constitutional alone can later become retroactively unconstitutional when it is 
part of a mosaic.
175
 
Critics also note that the Maynard and Jones opinions supporting the 
theory did not provide “any formulation for determining the size and scope 
of a mosaic that would trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny.”
176
 This creates 
an issue of practicality in police work, as well as a new basis of argument for 
defense attorneys.
177
 In conducting surveillance, police would have little 
guidance as to how long the investigation could go on before all of the data 
already collected becomes unconstitutional.
178
 Previously, the Supreme 
Court has expressed the need to have clear, definable Fourth Amendment 
tests that could be practically applied to police work.
179
 Carried to its limits, 
                                                 
169 Id. at 394, 401 (emphasis in original). 
170 Id. at 402 (quoting D.C. Cicruit Introduces, supra note 145). 
171 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562; Jones, 132 S.Ct at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
172 D.C. Circuit Introduces, supra note 145. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Walsh, supra note 6, at 236 (citing D.C. Circuit Introduces, supra note 145). 
However, Justices Alito and Sotomayor did recognize the difficulty of drawing the line of 
unconstitutionality. Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“We need not identify with 
precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was 
surely crossed before the 4 week mark”); Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(noting that the elements of the Katz analysis may be present in short-term GPS monitoring, as 
well as long-term GPS monitoring). 
177 D.C. Circuit Introduces, supra note 145. 
178 Id. 
179 See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (noting that Fourth 
Amendment restrictions “ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the 
police” instead of terms that “requir[e] the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline 
distinctions” (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-By-Case Adjudication” Versus 
“Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141)). 
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the theory could render entire investigations unconstitutional.
180
 Defense 
attorneys would argue that evidence against their clients was collected as a 
piece of some larger mosaic.
181
 These limitations lead some critics to 
conclude that the regulation of long-term surveillance is better left to the 
legislature.
182
 
A final critique of the use of mosaic theory by the Maynard court 
and Jones concurrences is the disassociation from Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.
183
 In order to distinguish the Knotts framework, the Maynard 
court relied on the Supreme Court’s reservation of “dragnet” surveillance in 
Knotts.
184
 Aside from that reservation, Knotts held that there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy when traveling “in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares.”
185
 Critics of Maynard and Jones believe that this precedent 
should have been followed, and that all of Jones’s public movements were 
therefore not private. Instead, the Maynard court hinged the case on the 
“dragnet” reservation left by Knotts, allowing the court to ignore the public 
thoroughfares precedent.
186
 Critics argue that the dragnet reservation of 
Knotts was actually considered in Karo, where in-home beeper surveillance 
was deemed to infringe on privacy rights, and thus Maynard and Jones 
should still have been bound by Knotts.
187
 Despite these criticisms, however, 
five justices of the Supreme Court appear ready to embrace the mosaic 
                                                 
180 D.C. Circuit Introduces, supra note 145. 
181 Walsh, supra note 6, at 236. 
182 See id. at 237–46; Constitutional Myths, supra note 5, at 808 (“legislatures can 
generate more nuanced, balanced, and accurate privacy rules when technology is in flux”); see 
also Orin Kerr, The Case Against the Mosaic Theory, USVJONES.COM: HOW TO DEFINE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE FOR SEARCHES IN PUBLIC?, http://usvjones.com/2012/06/04/
the-case-against-the-mosaic-theory/; Graham, 846 F.Supp.2d at 390; Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 964 
(Alito, J., concurring); but see Peter Swire & Erin Murphy, How to Address “Standardless 
Discretion” After Jones, USVJONES.COM: HOW TO DEFINE FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
FOR SEARCHING IN PUBLIC?, http://usvjones.com/2012/06/04/the-case-against-the-mosaic-
theory/ (“Some, most prominently Professor Orin Kerr, have urged courts to defer entirely to 
legislative and executive action. We have both criticized this approach on a number of 
grounds, including the public choice obstacles to legislation in this area, the political 
obligation of the Court to act as a co-equal branch, and the important moral authority carried 
by the Court’s pronouncements”). 
183 Walsh, supra note 6, at 230–31. 
184 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556. 
185 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. 
186 Walsh, supra note 6, at 230–31; D.C. Circuit Introduces, supra note 145145; 
see supra text accompanying notes 103–109 (explaining the circuit court’s reasoning in 
United States v. Maynard). 
187 Walsh, supra note 6, at 230–31; D.C. Circuit Introduces, supra note 145. 
Although, some critics of the mosaic theory have actually argued that Knotts and its holding 
that any public surveillance is permissible should be overruled. From Jones to Drones: How 
to Define Fourth Amendment Doctrine for Searches in Public, YOUTUBE at 0:54:18 (July 4, 
2012), http://youtu.be/_pGCWZGdq08?t=54m18s (Privacy scholars Marc Blitz, Susan 
Freiwald, Jim Harper, and Christopher Slobogin suggest that Knotts should be overruled). 
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theory of Fourth Amendment analysis based on Maynard and Justices Alito’s 
and Sotomayor’s concurring opinions in Jones.
188
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Analysis Applies to ALPR 
Data as it was Applied to GPS Data in Maynard and the Jones 
Concurrences 
ALPR systems collect the GPS coordinates of each license plate they 
encounter.
189
 The information is obtained quietly, without the vehicle 
driver’s knowledge, and without a warrant.
190
 Each data point is sent to law 
enforcement agents individually, but more importantly, the data points are 
compiled together in databases that are maintained for varying lengths of 
time.
191
 Thus, as with the location data obtained by GPS tracking devices that 
are attached to vehicles, Fourth Amendment privacy is implicated by the use 
of ALPR systems.
192
 As with GPS practices, it is the long-term collection of 
data that crosses the privacy threshold of reasonable expectations.
193
 Short-
term location information likely does not infringe on the driver’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy, because it is an established concept in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence that a person’s whereabouts are public.
194
 
However, a person’s whereabouts, recorded and tracked over a long period 
of time, reveal much about the privacies of life.
195
 Under the Katz analysis, 
there is both a subjective and objective expectation of privacy in such long-
term collection of a person’s otherwise public location data, as documented 
by ALPR systems, which thus equates to a Fourth Amendment search.
196
 
                                                 
188 See Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
189 See supra text accompanying notes 22–29 (describing the operation of ALPR 
systems). 
190 See supra text accompanying notes 22–29 (describing the operation of ALPR 
systems) 
191 See supra text accompanying notes 38–64 (explaining ALPR data collection 
practices). 
192 See supra text accompanying notes 38–64 (explaining ALPR data collection 
practices). 
193 See supra text accompanying notes 131–164 (discussing the Maynard court’s 
and Jones concurrences’ application of the mosaic theory to long-term GPS data). 
194 See supra text accompanying note 108 (noting the Knotts holding that there is 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in public travels). 
195 See supra note 140 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Sotomayor’s 
discussion of the privacy implications of a mosaic of data). 
196 See infra text accompanying notes 197–241 (applying the Katz subject and 
objective tests to the long-term collection of ALPR data and arguing that the elements are 
satisfied). 
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1.  The Subjective Element: A Mosaic of ALPR Data Satisfies the 
Probabilistic Model of the Subjective Expectation of Privacy 
Looking first to the subjective element, it is difficult to display an 
intent to keep one’s whereabouts private when that information is public by 
nature.
197
 To overcome this requirement of an outward display in the privacy 
interest in GPS data, the Maynard court and Jones concurring justices looked 
both to the mosaic theory of data compilation and Orin Kerr’s probabilistic 
model of the subjective element.
198
 The opinions found that although a 
stranger could easily observe a person’s location at any given time, it is 
highly unlikely that the same stranger could or would observe every 
movement over a four-week period.
199
 Therefore, a subjective expectation of 
privacy was present in the aggregate of location data over that period.
200
 
Similarly, there is a subjective expectation of privacy in the accumulation of 
several data points collected and compiled by ALPR systems over time.
201
 
Although the ALPR data points are generally intermittent, rather than the 
constant 24-hour surveillance provided by GPS, the likelihood that a stranger 
could or would collect a driver’s intermittent location points over a period of 
months or years—depending on how long ALPR data is retained in each 
jurisdiction—is highly unlikely.
202
 
This highlights a distinction between the privacy implications of 
GPS data and ALPR data.
203
 GPS tracking provides constant, uninterrupted 
monitoring of an individual’s whereabouts.
204
 Location data picked up by 
ALPR systems, however, are intermittent and are collected only when a 
person drives within range of an ALPR camera, or when a cruiser-mounted 
camera passes by another vehicle.
205
 As a result, one month of GPS data is 
likely more invasive and includes more data points than one month of 
                                                 
197 See supra text accompanying notes 88–93 (discussing the subjective element of 
the Katz analysis and the difficulty in expressing a subjective intent to keep something 
private). 
198 See supra text accompanying notes 131–164 (discussing the application of the 
mosaic theory and Orin Kerr’s probabilistic model in Maynard and the Jones concurrences). 
199 See supra text accompanying notes 141–144, 156 (discussing Orin Kerr’s 
probabilistic model and its application in Maynard and Justice Alito’s Jones concurrence). 
200 See supra text accompanying notes 141–144, 156 (discussing Orin Kerr’s 
probabilistic model and its application in Maynard and Justice Alito’s Jones concurrence). 
201 See supra text accompanying notes 38–64 (describing ALPR data collection 
practices). 
202 See supra text accompanying notes 22–29 (explaining how ALPR systems 
operate to collect intermittent location data). 
203 See infra text accompanying notes 204–205 (describing the distinction in the 
type of data obtained by GPS and ALPR systems). 
204 See supra text accompanying notes 137–139 (discussing the Maynard court’s 
characterization of the continuous nature of GPS data). 
205 See supra text accompanying notes 22–29 (explaining how ALPR systems 
operate to collect intermittent location data). 
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accumulated ALPR data.
206
 Crossing the privacy threshold by creating a 
spectrum of data unlikely observable by a stranger would require a longer 
accumulation of ALPR data than of GPS data.
207
 Though with several 
months or even years of ALPR data that is either compiled in a single 
jurisdiction or combined by a national agency, the subjective element will be 
met through the probabilistic model.
208
 It is beyond reasonable expectation 
that a person could or would intermittently observe a person’s whereabouts 
over months or years.
209
 Thus, the subjective element of the Katz analysis is 
met with application of Orin Kerr’s probabilistic model, as applied in 
Maynard and the Jones concurrences.
210
 Of course the more troublesome 
element of the Katz analysis is the objective, requiring an evaluation of what 
society (and the Court) is prepared to accept as a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.
211
 
2.  The Objective Element: Presumptions Weighing Against a Finding of a 
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy are Overcome when ALPR Data is 
Compiled into a Mosaic 
It has been established that there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a person’s whereabouts in public.
212
 The Maynard court and Jones 
concurrences both recognized this point.
213
 Knotts held that the public nature 
of a person’s location on public roads precludes any privacy interest.
214
 Karo 
highlighted this point by indicating that the threshold to the home divides 
what is generally public and private information.
215
 Similar to the GPS data 
collected in Knotts and Maynard/Jones, ALPR data can only be collected in 
public places due to the cameras’ locations on police cruisers and at 
                                                 
206 See supra text accompanying notes 204–205 (describing the distinction in the 
type of data obtained by GPS and ALPR systems). 
207 See supra text accompanying notes 142–143 (describing Orin Kerr’s 
probabilistic model of the Katz subjective element). 
208 See supra text accompanying notes 38–64 (describing ALPR data collection 
practices and the potential for abuse when the data is compiled). 
209 See supra text accompanying note 154 (quoting Justice Alito’s statement that 
society does not expect their movements to be tracked). 
210 See supra text accompanying notes 197–209 (arguing that application of the 
probabilistic model of the Katz subjective element to the case of ALPR data satisfies the 
element). 
211 See supra text accompanying notes 94–116 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
application of the Katz objective element of a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
212 See supra text accompanying note 108 (noting the Knotts holding that there is 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in a person’s public travels). 
213 See supra text accompanying notes 138, 153 (showing that the Maynard 
majority and Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones each drew a distinction between short term 
and long-term monitoring). 
214 See supra text accompanying note 108 (noting the Knotts holding that there is 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in a person’s public travels). 
215 See supra text accompanying notes 103–115 (illustrating the Knotts and Karo 
cases). 
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stationary points on public roads.
216
 As with GPS data, there is therefore an 
initial presumption that the public location data collected by ALPR systems 
is not subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy; something extra must 
be shown to evince reasonable expectation.
217
 
The Supreme Court’s surveillance technology jurisprudence suggests 
a second initial presumption: surveillance technology is used only to enhance 
police officers’ natural surveillance capabilities and does not provide 
extrasensory abilities.
218
 The Court stated in Knotts that a few GPS data 
points do not amount to a Fourth Amendment search because, when used in 
that way, the technology only enhances police officers’ natural surveillance 
capabilities.
219
 Maynard, and later the Jones concurrences, seemed to 
confirm this concept, as each court distinguished the facts of Knotts, 
differentiating the GPS data collected on Jones because it was more 
extensive.
220
 When an ALPR system only captures a person’s license plate at 
a few locations, the technology is only enhancing police officers’ ability to 
observe the vehicle and run the license plate against hotlists manually.
221
 To 
overcome this presumption of a mere ability enhancing technology, a 
criminal defendant arguing invasion of Fourth Amendment rights would 
need to show that the technology produced information that would not 
otherwise be obtainable without the technology.
222
 
Both presumptions are overcome when a vast quantity of 
information is collected and compiled together into a mosaic.
223
 As Justice 
Ginsburg articulated in the Maynard majority opinion, ongoing GPS 
surveillance reveals much about a person’s private life.
224
 Despite the public 
                                                 
216 See supra text accompanying notes 22–29 (explaining how ALPR systems 
operate to collect license plate data through cameras placed in stationary locations or mounted 
onto police cruisers). 
217 See supra text accompanying notes 212–216 (discussing that ALPR data is 
similar to GPS data in that it is a collection of public information and therefore presumptively 
not subject to privacy implication). 
218 See supra text accompanying notes 94–102 (outlining the Supreme Court’s 
application of the extra-sensory test in cases of surveillance technology). 
219 See supra text accompanying notes 107–108 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
application of the extra-sensory test in Knotts). 
220 See supra text accompanying notes 134–136 (quoting the Maynard court’s 
distinction of Knotts); supra text accompanying notes 153–154 (quoting Justice Alito’s 
distinction of Knotts in his Jones concurrence). Both the Maynard court and the Jones 
concurrences seemed to distinguish Knotts by relying on the reservation of “dragnet” 
surveillance methods in Knotts. 
221 See supra text accompanying notes 94–102 (outlining the Supreme Court’s 
application of the extra-sensory test in cases of surveillance technology). 
222 See supra text accompanying notes 94–102 (outlining the Supreme Court’s 
application of the extra-sensory test in cases of surveillance technology). 
223 See supra text accompanying notes 131–164 (discussing the application of the 
mosaic theory in Maynard and the Jones concurrences to find a Fourth Amendment violation 
in the accumulation of location data). 
224 See supra text accompanying note 140 (quoting Justice Ginsburg’s description 
of how long-term GPS data can reveal private information). 
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nature inherent in driving on public roads, a person does not reasonably 
expect each of his movements from place to place over the course of days, 
weeks, or months to be tracked.
225
 As stated above, ALPR data is, on its face, 
less invasive than GPS data because it is not continuous.
226
 However, as the 
use of ALPR systems grows throughout the nation, the probability of a single 
license plate being captured by a surveillance unit at least once during every 
journey increases.
227
 
While ALPR technology may not on its face have the capability of 
painting as clear a picture of private life as GPS tracking does, private habits 
would still be apparent in the collection of several ALPR data points.
228
 
Additionally, ALPR data can be easily collected and compiled for a longer 
period of time than GPS data, because the system does not focus on an 
individual person and does not require the maintenance of an ongoing GPS 
device on an individual’s vehicle.
229
 Extensive ALPR databases that could 
reveal more information than the twenty-eight days of GPS tracking in Jones 
are already in existence.
230
 Law enforcement agencies’ compilation and 
sharing of ALPR data is creating data banks of private information.
231
 It is 
this long-term portrayal of habits and patterns revealed over time that 
imposes a reasonable expectation of privacy and encroaches into the territory 
of the extra-sensory. 
Additionally, the fact that ALPR systems simultaneously collect 
location data on the entire driving population furthers the argument for its 
extrasensory capabilities.
232
 This sets ALPR data apart from most other 
surveillance technologies, including GPS devices, which monitor one 
targeted person.
233
 The Maynard court and Justice Alito’s Jones concurrence 
focused on the distinction between short-term and long-term GPS monitoring 
to find an extrasensory ability in the collection of GPS data.
234
 Long-term 
                                                 
225 See supra text accompanying note 154 (quoting Justice Alito’s statement that 
society does not expect their movements to be tracked). 
226 See supra text accompanying notes 203–206 (highlighting the distinction 
between continuously collected GPS data and intermittently collected ALPR data). 
227 See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing the usage of ALPR 
technology throughout the United States and in other countries). 
228 See supra text accompanying notes 38–64 (describing ALPR data collection 
practices and the potential for abuse when the data is compiled). 
229 See supra text accompanying notes 22–29 (explaining how ALPR systems 
operate to collect license plate data through cameras placed in stationary locations or mounted 
onto police cruisers). 
230 See supra text accompanying notes 38–50 (detailing the collection practices of 
various police jurisdictions, as well as third-party companies). 
231 See supra text accompanying notes 38–64 (detailing the collection practices of 
various police jurisdictions, as well as third-party companies). 
232 See supra text accompanying notes 22–29 (describing how ALPR systems 
function to capture data on every license plate that comes within the camera’s field of view). 
233 See supra text accompanying notes 117–128 (illustrating the use of a GPS 
tracking device to record the Jones’s movements). 
234 See supra text accompanying notes 134–136 (quoting the Maynard court’s 
distinction of Knotts on the basis of short-term versus long-term tracking); supra text 
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GPS surveillance approaches the extrasensory because, although a law 
enforcement officer could physically track a suspect for hours or days, it is 
highly unlikely that he could track the suspect consistently for twenty-eight 
days.
235
 Similarly, one ALPR camera arguably does the same work as an 
efficient police officer in a parked cruiser, copying down every license plate 
number she sees.
236
 However, it would be nearly impossible for police 
officers to simultaneously copy down all license plate numbers they 
encounter, and then compile the information into a large database, charting 
each license plate’s movements.
237
 Even if this system of manually observing 
and running every license plate were a physical possibility, it certainly could 
not be sustained for any length of time, because it would require the officers’ 
full attention.
238
 The vast amount of comprehensive information collected by 
ALPR systems sets it apart as an extrasensory technology that more easily 
infringes on Fourth Amendment rights than those technologies that have 
been deemed as only enhancing officers’ capabilities. 
Thus, like GPS device data, it is the mosaic of ALPR data points that 
overcomes the presumptions of no privacy in public places and that it is only 
an enhancing technology.
239
 The mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment 
analysis presented in Maynard and endorsed by the concurring opinions in 
Jones must be employed in the consideration of ALPR data in order to 
demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy.
240
 Although the Supreme 
Court majority was unwilling to accept the theory as a basis for the GPS 
analysis in the Jones decision, policy dictates that the mosaic theory should 
be adopted for Fourth Amendment analysis of ALPR data.
241
 
                                                                                                                   
accompanying notes 153–154 (quoting Justice Alito’s distinction of Knotts in his Jones 
concurrence on the basis of short-term versus long-term tracking). 
235 See supra text accompanying notes 137–138. 
236 See supra text accompanying notes 141–144, 156 (discussing Orin Kerr’s 
probabilistic model and its application in Maynard and Justice Alito’s Jones concurrence). 
237 See supra text accompanying notes 22–50 (explaining the operation of ALPR 
systems and the data compilation practices). 
238 See supra text accompanying notes 22–50 (explaining the operation of ALPR 
systems and the data compilation practices). 
239 See supra text accompanying notes 223–238 (arguing that the mosaic of ALPR 
data reveals private information and suggests that the technology is extrasensory). 
240 See supra text accompanying notes 223–238 (arguing that the mosaic of ALPR 
data reveals private information and suggests that the technology is extrasensory). 
241 See supra text accompanying note 164 (highlighting the Jones majority’s 
refusal to adopt the mosaic theory). 
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B.  Policy Dictates that the Mosaic Theory Should be Applied as a Basis 
for Fourth Amendment Privacy Analysis in the Case of ALPR Data 
The Supreme Court avoided taking up the issue of long-term 
technological surveillance in Knotts and Jones.
242
 Despite the availability of 
the mosaic concept, the Court seems reluctant to expand the Fourth 
Amendment’s privacy protection so broadly.
243
 However, ALPR data 
collection practices encroach more broadly on the public’s sense of privacy 
than does GPS tracking because, unlike GPS devices, ALPR cameras capture 
location data indiscriminately on each license plate they encounter.
244
 The 
unfettered use of surveillance tactics on the general public calls for a 
heightened level of privacy protection.
245
 As Justice Sotomayor stated in her 
Jones concurrence, allowing the government to collect “a substantial 
quantum of intimate information about any person” may “alter the 
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to 
democratic society.”
246
 If the Court is unwilling to find a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the long-term collection of a person’s whereabouts, 
a precedent may be set that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
anything conducted outside the home.
247
 
Additionally, as Justice Alito pointed out in his Jones concurrence, 
not recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in a mosaic of location 
data would lead to inconsistent privacy infringement outcomes.
248
 For 
example, since Jones confirmed that the physical trespass analysis of Fourth 
Amendment law is still valid, a mere few hours of GPS tracking may be 
considered a Fourth Amendment infringement if the officer physically 
touched the defendant’s car while installing the tracking device.
249
 However, 
without the mosaic theory’s application to ALPR data collection, five years’ 
worth of documentation of a defendant’s travels across the country, as 
                                                 
242 See supra text accompanying note 109 (highlighting the Court’s reservation of 
the long-term surveillance issue in Knotts); supra text accompanying notes 120–121 
(highlighting the Court’s reservation of the long-term surveillance issue in Jones). 
243 See supra text accompanying note 164 (highlighting the Jones majority’s 
refusal to adopt the mosaic theory). 
244 See supra text accompanying notes 22–29 (explaining how ALPR systems 
operate to collect location data on every license plate that comes into the camera’s field of 
vision). 
245 See supra text accompanying notes 243–244 (discussing the use of ALPR 
systems on the general public). 
246 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
247 See sources cited supra note 187 (noting some privacy scholars’ implications 
that the holding in Knotts that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in public travels 
should be overruled). 
248 See supra text accompanying note 151 (quoting Justice Alito’s concerns about 
the majority’s reversion to property law in the Jones opinion). 
249 See supra text accompanying note 151 (quoting Justice Alito’s concerns about 
the majority’s reversion to property law in the Jones opinion). 
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collected by various enforcement agencies and then compiled into one 
database, would not be an infringement of the right to privacy because no 
physical trespass was involved.
250
 The inconsistency demonstrates that 
technology creates the need for expanding concepts of law.
251
 Application of 
the mosaic theory to Fourth Amendment privacy law would protect the type 
of privacy implication inherent in modern surveillance practices.
252
 
C.  Alternatively, Legislative Action Should Restrict the Collection and 
Compilation Practices of ALPR Data 
Legislative action may be a more direct way of combating the 
privacy implications of widespread ALPR data collection than adoption of 
the mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy.
253
 Since the issue arises not 
in the use of the systems, but in the compilation of data collected by the 
systems, restriction on how the data is compiled would solve the problem 
without the need to expand privacy protections.
254
 As Justice Alito stated in 
Jones, “[i]n circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best 
solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”
255
 
Many jurisdictions keep ALPR data on file for months or years, 
which alone may be enough to violate reasonable privacy interests. Once that 
data is transferred to another agency or third-party data bank, there is no 
limit on the length of time that the information may be retained.
256
 However, 
if there were restrictions in place on the length of time that all state and 
federal agencies, as well as third-party companies, can keep ALPR data, the 
database would not present the detailed image of private life that years’ 
worth of data has the potential to do.
257
 Restrictions such as those imposed 
                                                 
250 See supra text accompanying note 151 (quoting Justice Alito’s concerns about 
the majority’s reversion to property law in the Jones opinion). 
251 See supra text accompanying note 151 (quoting Justice Alito’s concerns about 
the majority’s reversion to property law in the Jones opinion). 
252 See supra text accompanying notes 242–251 (discussing the need for 
application of the mosaic theory to Fourth Amendment analysis due to the capability of ALPR 
to infringe on privacy interests without a physical trespass). 
253 See supra note 182 and accompanying text (noting the suggestion of some 
privacy scholars, the Graham court, and Justice Alito in Jones that the issue of long-term 
surveillance may be better left to the legislature). New Hampshire and Maine recognized this 
fact and have already enacted legislature restricting ALPR data compilation. See supra note 
64 and accompanying text (describing New Hampshire’s and Maine’s statutes affecting ALPR 
data). 
254 See supra text accompanying notes 189–241 (arguing that it is the mosaic of 
ALPR location data that infringes on reasonable expectations of privacy). 
255 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring); see sources cited supra note 182 
(noting Justice Alito’s suggestion in his Jones concurrence that the issue of long-term 
surveillance may be better left to the legislature). 
256 See supra note 54 (discussing the interest of federal agencies and third-party 
companies in accumulating ALPR data banks). 
257 See supra text accompanying notes 38–54 (discussing the uses of ALPR data 
banks). 
31
Gutierrez-Alm: The Privacies of Life: Automatic License Plate Recognition is Unc
Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2015
158 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:127 
 
by the State of Maine, which identify ALPR data as confidential and limit 
the retention time to 21 days should be enacted for every jurisdiction, 
agency, and company that uses the technology or compiles the results.
258
 
Since ALPR data is intermittently collected, unlike the continuity of GPS 
data, 21 days would likely not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment 
violation.
259
 With only 21 days of data, there would likely be few data points 
recorded, even if the vehicle was spotted once during every trip.
260
 
Admittedly, 21 days seems a somewhat arbitrary line to draw. Establishing 
the point at which the data should be deleted, that is, the point at which the 
sum of ALPR location data on a person infringes the person’s privacy rights, 
is not easily determined.
261
 Maine’s 21 day limitation might be an 
appropriate distinction, but perhaps the data should be kept longer for more 
in-depth police investigations.
262
 Or, with the expanding use of ALPR 
systems, and therefore the more frequent data points obtained on each 
journey a driver takes, perhaps the limit should be shortened to seven days or 
14 days.
263
 Since ALPR data is intermittent, rather than constant like GPS 
data, perhaps ALPR is best limited by the number of data points collected on 
a single license plate.
264
 Justices Alito and Sotomayor suggested in Jones that 
the line would be difficult to draw with respect to GPS data.
265
 They agreed, 
however, “the line was surely crossed” at four weeks of surveillance.
266
 
Regardless of where the line is drawn with ALPR data, the most direct 
                                                 
258 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 29-A, § 2117-A (2009); see supra note 64 (describing 
Maine’s ALPR data retention statute). 
259 See supra text accompanying notes 38–64 (describing ALPR data collection 
practices and the potential for abuse when the data is compiled); supra text accompanying 
notes 117–128 (illustrating the use of a GPS tracking device to record the Jones’s 
movements). 
260 See supra text accompanying note 140 (quoting Justice Ginsburg’s description 
of how long-term GPS data can reveal private information). Twenty-one days of ALPR data, 
even if one data point per trip were collected, likely would not rise to the level of privacy 
infringement described by Justice Ginsburg in Maynard; but see sources cited supra note 140 
(Julian Sanchez’s illustration of the invasiveness of ongoing GPS tracking points to the 
implication that perhaps only a few location points are needed to reveal a detailed image of a 
person’s private life). 
261 See supra text accompanying note 140 (quoting Justice Ginsburg’s description 
of how long-term GPS data can reveal private information). It is difficult to determine just 
how many ALPR data points would be needed to reach this level of intrusiveness. See supra 
text accompanying notes 170–182 (discussing the difficulties in application of the mosaic 
theory to surveillance practices). 
262 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 29-A, § 2117-A (2009); see supra text accompanying notes 
38–54 (discussing the uses of ALPR data banks). 
263 See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing the usage of ALPR 
technology throughout the United States and in other countries). 
264 See supra text accompanying notes 22–50 (explaining the operation of ALPR 
systems and the data compilation practices). 
265 See sources cited supra note 176 (noting Justices Alito’s and Sotomayor’s 
acknowledgement of the difficulty with drawing a line on unconstitutionality in the mosaic). 
266 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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protection of the privacy interest in the mosaic of a driver’s long-term 
location data would be through legislative action.
267
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Although the act of capturing license plate data and locations in 
public places does not by itself violate the Fourth Amendment, the 
compilation, storage, and referencing of that data collected over the long-
term is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment under the 
mosaic analysis put forth in Maynard.
268
 Application of the mosaic theory 
permits the compiled ALPR data to be considered as a whole.
269
 The 
aggregated data satisfies both the subjective and objective expectations of 
privacy of the Katz Fourth Amendment analysis.
270
 When Maynard was 
affirmed sub nom. in Jones, the majority refused to accept the theory, but 
five justices in concurring opinions expressed a willingness to adopt the 
theory.
271
 The Court is set for a future 5-4 decision in favor of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in aggregated location data.
272
 Given the current state 
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the lack of data compilation 
restrictions, new surveillance technologies such as GPS and ALPR demand 
application of the mosaic theory.
273
 Failure to do so will inevitably lead to 
inconsistent findings and a strained understanding of reasonable privacy 
expectations.
274
 Alternatively, or perhaps additionally for further precaution, 
legislatures need to step in and restrict the length of time that ALPR data 
may be retained.
275
 It is only through these devices that former Chief Justice 
                                                 
267 See supra text accompanying notes 253–266 (arguing that the issue of ALPR 
data collection practices is best left to the legislature in order to avoid the accumulation of a 
mosaic with privacy implications). 
268 See supra text accompanying notes 189–252 (arguing that application of the 
mosaic theory to ALPR data renders the collection of data unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
269 See supra text accompanying notes 129–130 (defining the mosaic theory of 
aggregated information). 
270 See supra text accompanying notes 197–241 (arguing that application of the 
mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment analysis to ALPR data satisfies the Katz test). 
271 See supra text accompanying notes 149–163 (discussing the two concurring 
opinions in Jones v. United States); supra note 159 (discussing Justice Sotomayor’s agreement 
with both the majority and Alito’s opinion). 
272 See supra text accompanying note 188 (explaining that the Supreme Court 
justices who joined the concurrences in Jones may make up a future majority in a case with 
only technological surveillance and no physical trespass). 
273 See supra text accompanying notes 242–252 (discussing the policy reasons for 
adopting the mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment analysis). 
274 See supra text accompanying note 151 (quoting Justice Alito’s concerns about 
the majority’s reversion to property law in the Jones opinion). 
275 See supra text accompanying notes 253–267 (proposing that the legislatures 
should enact restrictions on ALPR data retention in order to preserve privacy). 
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Rehnquist’s balance between citizens’ privacy and the state’s safety can be 
achieved.
276
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
276 See supra text accompanying notes 1–3 (discussing Justice Rehnquist’s 
application of a balancing test in a 1974 Kansas Law Review article, Is an Expanded Right of 
Privacy Consistent with Fair and Effective Law Enforcement? Or: Privacy, You’ve Come a 
Long Way, Baby). 
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